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 1.  Introduction
 Lack of access to internal data on bank lending decisions has seriously limited empirical research
on corporate loan contracting. Drawing on a unique panel data set, this paper contributes to the
understanding of bank lending behavior. We address three questions relating to the economic
function of collateral in bank lending strategy. First, what is the empirical relationship between the
incidence and the degree of collateralization, and expected default risk? Second, what role does
collateral play in the context of an information-intensive lending relationship? Third, from an ex-
post point of view, what is the impact of collateral on how lending institutions behave if borrow-
ers face financial distress?
 The first question refers to the impact of expected default risk on the provision of collateral.
Theoretical predictions differ considerably with collateral being positively related to borrower
quality in some models, and negatively related in others (e.g. Bester 1985, 1994). The second and
third questions build on recent theoretical work concerning the role of relationship lending (Welch
1997, Longhofer/Santos 1998). The issue at hand is whether the decision to become the house-
bank of a corporate client has an impact on the quality or quantity of collateral demanded. Theo-
retical predictions in this case depend considerably on the role collateral is believed to play in a
possible renegotiation game between the bank and its customer. In our empirical analysis, we fo-
cus on the type of activities a bank undertakes once a borrower is in financial distress. These post-
distress activities can be related to the structure of the bank-client relationship before the distress
occurred, in particular to the amount of collateral and the intensity of the relationship to the bank.
 While earlier studies mostly rely on external industry surveys, we are able to base our analysis on
first-hand credit-file data collected from five leading universal banks in Germany. The data set is a
fairly comprehensive projection of 200 bank credit files into 130 variables which were collected
for the five-year period 1992-1996. This data set potentially offers a number of new insights into
the real value of financial relationships. The banks' internal borrower ratings were used to evaluate
borrower quality, and the banks' own assessment of their housebank status serves to identify in-
formation-intensive financial relationships.
 Moreover, our test of the role of collateral in financial relationships utilizes information about the
specific type of collateral pledged to the bank, about its current value, and about the banks' activi-
ties if borrowers face financial distress.   2
 The major results of our study support the view that collateral is used primarily as a tool to con-
trol the lenders' strategic position vis-à-vis the borrower (and other lenders) in future games of
renegotiation. Thus, the incidence of collateral, as well as the degree of collateralization, are
found to be unrelated to ex-ante default risk. Furthermore, collateral is positively related to the
intensity of the financial relationship (i.e. the banks' housebank status) and increases the likelihood
of workout investments by the lender. These results are consistent with the view of collateral as a
contractual instrument that aims at strategically restricting future borrower behavior in a way de-
sired by the lender, as hypothesized by Welch (1997) and Morris/Shin (1999).
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the role of collateral in the theoretical and
empirical literature on loan contract design and develops the main hypotheses for the empirical
part of the paper. Section 3 contains a description of the data set and a number of descriptive sta-
tistics. Sections 4 and 5 comprise econometric tests of our main hypotheses, identifying determi-
nants of the collateral decision (Section 4), and analyzing bank behavior in situations of borrower
distress (Section 5). Section 6 contains a discussion of the results and concludes.
 
 
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND DERIVATION OF HYPOTHESES
2.1  Theoretical concepts and hypotheses
 The recent theoretical literature on financial intermediation has stressed the role of information-
intensive relationships between borrowers and lenders as a major aspect differentiating bank loans
from corporate bonds.1 In a model with informational asymmetries, relationship lending may re-
store efficiency by establishing long-term implicit contracts between borrowers and lenders. An
established relationship allows the lender to renegotiate contract terms at low cost, thereby creat-
ing financial flexibility, and reducing credit rationing. A financial relationship is effectively a long
term commitment in which lenders develop an informational privilege vis-à-vis both the market
and competing banks. For the lender, such a close financial relationship yields a certain degree of
ex post bargaining power (see Greenbaum et al. 1989, Sharpe 1990, Fischer 1990, Rajan 1992,
and Petersen/Rajan 1995). The housebank-function of German universal banks is a good example   3
of such a long-term relationship with a corporate client. The housebank is regarded as the premier
lender of a firm. It has access to more intensive and more timely information than a comparable
“normal” bank, allowing it to provide insurance-like services like liquidity insurance or better de-
cisions in borrower distress (Fischer 1990, Rajan 1992, Elsas/Krahnen 1998).
 Our subsequent analysis is based on the assumption that a housebank, though not necessarily the
exclusive financier of a given firm, is the only creditor who sustains an implicit contract with the
borrower. This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence indicating that firms typically
have a multitude of bank lenders (Ongena/Smith 1998b, Preece/Mullineaux 1996), but neverthe-
less have at most a single bank relationship with an informational privilege. We thus view the
housebank status as a discrete characteristic of a bank-client relationship.
 Collateral plays an important role in many models of bank behavior. Bester (1985) and
Besanko/Thakor (1987), building on the ex ante screening model by Stiglitz/Weiss (1981), inter-
pret collateral as a signal which allows a bank to solve the adverse selection problem inherent in
debt financing under asymmetric information. In a model with two types of projects, high and low
risk, a separating equilibrium is shown to exist. Low-risk borrowers generally choose contracts
with a high level of collateral. High-risk borrowers, in contrast, prefer to have loans with no col-
lateral. The signaling models thus predict a negative correlation between loan risk and collateral.
Note that the signaling model is concerned with the pre-contractual stage. Once the contract has
been concluded, however, the informational problem is resolved in principle, and the economic
function of collateral in a multi-period, dynamic setting remains to be explored.
 A second class of models focuses on the ex post monitoring function of banks. Bester (1994) de-
velops a model of debt renegotiation that predicts a positive correlation between default risk and
collateralization. In this model, a creditor cannot distinguish between strategic default (i.e. the
borrower is cheating), and default due to a bad state realization of the world. Therefore, the pro-
vision of (outside2) collateral will reduce the debtor's incentive for strategic default. In a model
                                                                                                                                                      
 1  For a survey on the theory of financial intermediation see Bhattacharya/Thakor (1993) or Thakor (1995).
 2  “Inside collateral“ refers to collateral which reallocates the given adhesive wealth of a firm, while "outside
collateral" extends the adhesive wealth. An economically more appealing distinction would be between colla-
teralized assets whose value is (highly) correlated with the earning assets of the firm and those which are not
correlated with the cash flow stream derived from the firm’s normal business. In most theoretical models, out-
side collateral is implicitly modelled as having a lower correlation than inside collateral, and this feature basi-
cally drives the results.   4
with inside collateral, Rajan/Winton (1995) analyze the case in which the collateralization decision
of an inside bank can be observed by less informed outsiders thereby transforming private infor-
mation on borrower quality into public information. The inside bank will be compensated for the
externality by a more senior debt position. Since the lender tends to collateralize loans with high
risk borrowers, there is again a positive association between risk and collateral implied. Finally,
the prediction of a positive correlation between project risk and collateral corresponds to conven-
tional wisdom in banking, which views collateral as a means to lower the risk exposure of a bank
(see e.g. Berger/Udell 1990). Our first hypothesis summarizes the above discussion.
 Hypothesis 1: The incidence of collateral, as well as the extent of collateralization, are an in-
creasing function of borrower default risk.
 We now turn to the role of relationship lending as a determinant of the collateral decision.
Boot/Thakor (1994) develop a model of relationship lending as an infinitely repeated moral haz-
ard game. Loan contract terms, notably the interest rate and collateralization, are determined si-
multaneously. Collateral, which is outside collateral in this model, is a binary ("all or nothing")
variable. In the relationship equilibrium, for borrowers without a positive track record, the bank
charges high interest rates and requires the provision of collateral. After privately observing the
success of the borrower, the bank is willing to lower the interest rate and is no longer requiring
collateral. This leads to a negative association between relationship intensity and collateral.
 A recent paper by Longhofer/Santos (1998), however, reaches the opposite conclusion. In their
model, a higher seniority of a bank's claim will increase the likelihood of a relationship emerging.
Since seniority of a claim against the assets of the firm is equivalent to the provision of inside col-
lateral, Longhofer/Santos’ treatment of collateral differs from Boot/Thakor (1994). Following
Longhofer/Santos (1998), additional collateral allows the relationship lender to benefit more from
a successful turnaround in bad states of nature, thereby increasing his willingness to be financially
supportive and, in particular, to invest in workouts. Furthermore, with assets pledged, the bor-
rower has less room to increase equity value through asset substitution. Hence, the model predicts
a positive correlation between the extent of collateralization and the intensity of a bank-borrower
relationship. This result is similar to the conclusion reached by Welch (1997). This author shows
that, ex-ante, it is optimal to give seniority to the lender with maximum ex-post bargaining power.
Due to its information privilege, this lender will be the housebank (or the main bank) of the firm.   5
The optimal arrangement will minimize coordination costs, and will thus facilitate debt restruc-
turing.
 To summarize, theoretical models support a positive as well as a negative association between
relationship lending and collateralization. This constitutes our next hypothesis.
 Hypothesis 2: There is a positive (negative) relationship between the intensity of a bank-
borrower relationship and the provision of collateral in loan contracts.
 According to the argument of Longhofer/Santos (1998) and Welch (1997), housebanks will be
interested in accumulating collateral, thereby improving their bargaining positions in possible fu-
ture distress situations. On the basis of a strong collateral position, and a privileged access to in-
formation about the borrower, the bank is expected to play a more active role in the restructuring
of distressed borrowers. This leads to our final hypothesis.
 Hypothesis 3: Given that borrowers are distressed, the willingness of a lender to engage in
workout activities is positively related to its housebank status and its degree of
collateralization .
2.2 Related empirical evidence
 We will now turn to the empirical evidence. While there are some papers relating to hypotheses 1
and 2, we are unaware of a study addressing the role of collateral as an incentive device in distress
situations, which is our third hypothesis.
 In a seminal study, Berger/Udell (1990) empirically analyze the risk-collateral relationship. They
use data from the 1988 "US Survey of Bank Lending Terms" and consistently find a positive rela-
tionship between credit risk and collateral. The authors use two different proxies for credit risk.
The first proxy is an ex post measure of aggregate bank risk. It defined as the fraction of borrow-
ers with non-performing loans among all borrowers of a given bank. The second risk proxy cap-
tures credit risk on the level of the individual borrower. It is defined as the credit spread, i.e. the
difference between the contractual rate of the loans and a risk-free reference interest rate. This is
an indirect and potentially biased measure of ex ante risk since the spread is determined by several
factors of which a borrower's default risk is only one (see Harhoff/Körting (1998) and El-
sas/Krahnen (1998) for empirical details).   6
Berger/Udell (1995) extend this analysis to aspects of relationship lending and the financing of
small firms by using data from the 1988 "National Survey of Small Business Finance". They use
balance sheet ratios (e.g. leverage, profit margin) as risk proxies and duration as a proxy for rela-
tionship intensity. The authors claim that their findings support a positive risk-collateral correla-
tion, though leverage is the only significant explanatory variable out of eight risk measures. Dura-
tion, as an explanatory variable for the incidence of collateral , has a significant negative coeffi-
cient, thereby implying decreasing collateral requirements for more intensive bank-borrower rela-
tionships. Harhoff/Körting (1998) replicate this study with German data and reach identical con-
clusions.
These empirical findings with respect to relationship lending are based on the interpretation of
duration as an adequate measure for relationship lending. This assumes that duration is to some
extent associated with information intensity. This might be problematic if the data set under con-
siderations does not consist of firms observed at the beginning of a bank-borrower relationship,
which is typically not the case. Additionally, recent empirical evidence raises further doubts on
duration as a proxy for relationship intensity. Ongena/Smith (1998a) find a significantly positive
impact of contract duration on the likelihood of relationship termination for the Norwegian mar-
ket. However, those firms presumably most in need of relationship finance (i.e. small or young or
growth firms) maintain the shortest relationships. Furthermore, Elsas/Krahnen (1998) find no sig-
nificant difference in the mean contract duration between their sub-samples of housebank and
non-housebank relationships. Additionally, duration is not significant in either of the authors' re-
gressions, though Elsas/Krahnen find evidence for distinct behavior by relationship lenders identi-
fied as housebanks.
 The most closely related studies to ours with respect to the data set are Degryse/van Cayseele
(1998) and Machauer/Weber (1998). Like us, both studies use credit file data, and their indicator
for relationship lending is a self-evaluation of the bank, i.e. whether it views itself as the primary
bank. The implication of changing the relationship variable is fundamental. The authors find that
the probability of pledging collateral increases rather than decreases if the bank is the borrower's
main bank. However, the study of Degryse/von Cayseleen (1998) study relies only on noisy risk
proxies like company size and loan type. The analysis by Machauer/Weber (1998) is based on the
same data set as this study but differs fundamentally in terms of methodology and focus of the
study.   7
 In summary, only little empirical evidence on the link between relationship lending, risk and col-
lateral exists. The existing studies use noisy proxies for borrower quality and usually only a crude
proxy for relationship lending. In the remainder of this paper we address the hypotheses, outlined
above, on the role of collateral in relationship lending. We use banks' internal borrower ratings as
a more direct measure of borrower quality and the banks own assessment of their relationship
status to identify information-intensive bank-borrower relationships.
 
3. DATA SET AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
3.1  General data description
 The data set underlying our analysis includes corporate debtors of five major German banks:
Bayerische Vereinsbank (now HypoVereinsbank), Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Genossenschafts-
bank (DG Bank), Dresdner Bank, and Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB).3 The data set con-
tains general company characteristics (e.g. legal form, branches), a complete overview on loan
contracts and their specific terms (e.g. collateral, maturity, credit volume), balance sheet data and
the bank's own risk assessment (internal rating). This information was collected directly from the
banks' credit files.
 Our data is a random sample drawn from a population of all corporate customers with some ac-
tive business at some time between January 1992 and January 1997 who also meet a number of
selection criteria.4 First, companies had to be medium sized, i.e. with an annual turnover between
DM 50m and DM 500m (US$ 25m -US$ 250m). Due to the absence of surveillance by rating
agencies and the lack of rigorous disclosure requirements,5 we expect this company size segment
to be subject to a significant degree of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers,
thus constituting a prime population for the analysis of issues related to relationship lending and
loan contract design. Second, to ensure a minimum level of information in the bank credit files, a
minimum total loan size of DM 3m (US$ 1.5m) was imposed. All loans surpassing DM 3m are
                                               
 3  These institutions comprise the three largest German private banks, the (national) apex cooperative bank, and
the largest (regional) apex savings banks. In the list of the largest banking firms of the country at year end
1995, they comprise the ranks 1, 2, 3, 5, 8.
 4  For a detailed presentation of the data set, see Elsas et al. (1998).
 5  Note that no company in our sample is listed on a stock exchange, and only 12 out of 200 are public limited
companies (AG) under German law.   8
subject to the regulatory notification requirement of Article 14 of the KWG (German Banking
Act), and have to be communicated to a national credit bureau.6 Third, clients with registered
seats in the former GDR (East Germany) were excluded, and, fourth, inclusion in the population
required that the respective client had at least one longer-term investment loan with a fixed inter-
est and repayment schedule.
 The sample used for the subsequent analyses of Section 3 and 4 consists of 25 customers from
each of the five banks, resulting in a total of 125 individual debtors (representative sample).7 For
each of these credit relationships, the full set of variables was recorded from the credit files when-
ever a credit decision (e.g. loan renewal, change in credit volume) was documented, or the firm
was re-rated. The observation period comprises five complete years (1992 to 1996). Thus, for
example, for a credit relationship with three credit decisions and one additional re-rating, there are
four observations per variable. The advantage of such a procedure is that for all structural vari-
ables such as credit volume, collateralization or rating, we know the value of each variable (after
an initial observation) during the complete observation period. In order to avoid a potential bias
due to non-synchronous data-collection, we stratified our panel by simulating data collection at
the end of each year between 1992 and 1996. If for a given firm and a given year no contract
change occured, i.e. no data collection was triggered, we generated an artificial observation.8
These artificial observations are based on the respective preceding real observation whose value
equals by construction the actual one.
 This leads to a synchronous panel data set with a theoretical number of 625 observations (5 years
x 125 individuals).9 The actual number of observations is smaller, since there are initial observa-
tions occurring later than 1992, the beginning of our observation period, or due to missing values.
                                               
 6 §14 of the KWG (German Banking Act) requires each bank to report the name and loan terms of each debtor
with a consolidated debit balance of DM 3m or above. The Bundesbank, on behalf of the Federal Banking Su-
pervisory Authority (BAKred), collects all notifications and produces a quarterly consolidated statement per
customer. These are in turn accessible by all reporting banks.
 7 See Elsas et al. (1998) for a detailed description of the data and the sampling procedure.
 8  Note that this procedure is not suitable for variables that did not trigger a new observation, but are time-
variant having a higher variability than the structural variables, such as the interest rate. However, we do not
use such variables in the present paper.
 9  If an individual has more than one observation in one specific year, only the last one was used.   9
 The analysis in Section 5 is based on a the sample of potentially distressed borrowers. These bor-
rowers meet all of the selection criteria mentioned above, i.e. they belong to the same population.
Additionally, all these borrowers faced a poor rating at least once during the observation period.
Poor ratings indicate that banks expect these borrowers to be problematic, i.e. potentially dis-
tressed. In the standardized rating system that we use, with six different classes of borrower qual-
ity (see below), a negative rating is either a rating of 5 or 6. For each bank, 15 cases were drawn
from this stratified subset of the population, yielding a sub-total of 75 borrowers. We label this
sample PD (potentially distressed).
 
3.2 The identification of housebanks
 With respect to the housebank status, we rely primarily on an internal attribution, namely on the
assessment by the credit manager in charge of that particular customer. The credit manager was
given a questionnaire asking for a housebank-attribution ("Do you feel that your bank is the
housebank for that particular client?"). The respondents had to check "yes" or "no", and were
further asked to give a brief explanation in writing. The resulting dummy variable is labeled
“HB_inter”. Then a second variable, with information taken from the credit files, was used to
double check the reliability of the credit officer’s attribution. Whenever, in the credit files, a par-
ticular decision taken by the bank in question was explained using arguments explicitly relating to
its housebank-status (e.g. "we are the housebank", "we are the main bank", "we have a special
responsibility", etc.), the variable "HB_exter" was assigned the value of one, and zero otherwise.
Since this external attribution was recorded separately for every credit event, a time series of
"HB_exter"-attributions resulted. These dummies represent an external attribution of the house-
bank characteristics.
 From these two proxies for housebank relations, we construct a third, modified indicator variable
(“HBM”, modified housebank attribution) which is used for our subsequent regression analyses.
HBM attributes in a first step the value 1 and 0 to all relationships that were consistently grouped
as either "housebank" or "non-housebank" in both attributions, “HB_inter” and "HB_exter". In-
consistent attributions were recorded in 24 cases. They are due to changing attributions in the
time series of "HB_exter" observations. These inconsistencies were resolved by use of the addi-
tional information contained in the written explanation given in the questionnaire.   10
 The resulting housebank attribution thus differs substantially from other measures of relationship
intensity used in the literature, such as duration or the number of bank lenders. We believe our
attribution to be a more reliable indicator since it is directly based on the judgement of one of the
parties to the implicit contract.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
 This section provides some basic descriptive statistics of the sample of representative borrowers
(R-sample).10
 We use three different variables to describe the degree of collateralization, each based on a differ-
ent scale of measurement. The most commonly used variable in the literature is a simple dichoto-
mous variable assigned a value of one if a loan contract is collateralized and zero if it is not. We
label this variable COLYN. A second variable differentiates according to the type of collateral. The
variable COLTYPE is assigned a value of zero if a credit relationship is not collateralized, one if
the loan11 is collateralized only by real securities (land charges, mortgages, assignments of ac-
counts receivable), two if the loan is secured only by personal securities (guarantees), and three if
the latter two types are combined. Thus, COLTYPE is analogous to COLYN with respect to all
debtors, but it contains more information about the type of collateral provided. A third variable,
labeled COLDEGREE, measures the degree of collateralization in terms of value. It is defined as
the ratio of collateral value (as assessed by the bank) to total credit volume supplied by the bank.
This variable takes on values in the closed interval from zero to one, multiplied by a scaling factor
of 100. Therefore, if the variable COLDEGREE has the value “100”, the credit provided by the
bank is fully secured. The bank, according to its own assessment, has zero exposure in the sense
of capital at risk. However, if COLDEGREE is assigned a value “0”, this does not necessarily im-
ply the absence of priority rights to firm assets. Though in such a case the bank estimates collat-
eral value to be negligible, it may nevertheless have property rights on specific firm assets. This
conceptual difference between COLYN and a COLDEGREE of 0 is important, because even zero-
                                               
 10  Some descriptive statistics for the PD sample are provided in section 5. A more detailed description is con-
tained in Brunner/Krahnen (2000).
 11  The term "loan" is imprecise because any data on collateral we used relates to a borrower's total credit volume
with a particular bank, not to a single loan.   11
valued collateral may change the incentive of a company or manager to behave in an opportunistic
way, which of course is not true if no collateral is pledged at all.
 Table I below shows the frequency distribution of observations for COLYN and COLTYPE differ-
entiated first by the dummy-variable LIMLIAB, which takes on a value of “1” if the company is
incorporated and “0” else. The second differentiation of the frequency distribution is with respect
to the variable BANK, which depicts the bank from which the observation originates; its values
range from 1 to 5.
 
 Table I
 Collateral according to incidence, type, and limited liability (Year 1996, All years)
     COLYN  LIMLIAB
     1996  1992 – 1996  1992-1996
     1  0  Sum  1  0  Sum      0  1  sum
   1  21  2  23  100  14  114    0  25  148  173
   2  15  11  26  72  54  126    1  79  250  329
 BANK  3  11  14  25  59  66  125  COLTYPE  2  0  2  2
   4  20  5  25  100  18  118    3  3  85  88
   5  21  3  24  88  21  109    sum  107  485  592
   sum  88  35  123  419  173  592          
 
 Table I shows considerable variation between the banks in our sample, in particular with respect
to the percentage of collateralized loans. For example, in the overall period, only 14% of Bank 1
observations are not collateralized, in contrast to 53% of the loans at Bank 3. Thus, it seems to be
important to control for effects due to bank heterogeneity in subsequent regression analyses.
Furthermore, since the absolute number of observations of noncollateralized loans for any given
year is small for some banks, pooling of time-series and cross-sectional observations is necessary
to carry out econometric tests.
 The frequency distribution of noncollateralized observations differentiated by companies with and
without limited liability (COLTYPE versus LIMLIAB) implies that the fraction of noncollateralized
observations is smaller for companies with unlimited liability (25 out of 107 versus 148 out of   12
485). There are only two observations in the total sample period with only personal securities, and
these companies have limited liability. Thus, the variable COLTYPE is informative for descriptive
purposes only. Finally, 85 out of 88 observations with both real and personal securities are com-
panies with a limited liability structure, i.e. are incorporated. This pattern is consistent with the
idea that personal securities are used as collateral to overcome the limited liability status of a cor-
poration.
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 Figure 1: Frequency Distribution of COLDEGREE (degree of collateralization)
 Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of COLDEGREE on its range of possible values from 0
to 100 for the total sample period and all individuals. Note that there are two significant peaks at
values of 0 and 100, respectively. This pattern highlights the fact that the ratio of collateral value
to credit volume is a censored variable. COLDEGREE is left censored because all unsecured loans
are assigned a value of “0”. By a similar argument, a value above 100 is not observed, since a
collateralization in excess of "fully secured" is not differentiated. Nevertheless, there may be debt-
ors with more assets pledged to the bank than required for attaining “fully secured” (right cen-
soring).12 Thus, an analysis using the variable COLDEGREE has to control for the censored nature
of this variable by employing a Tobit-procedure.
                                               
 12  Usually, the banks did not evaluate collateral to be in excess of the total credit volume.   13
 Table II shows the different types of collateral (COLTYPE) differentiated by housebank status
(HBM) for 1996.13 In addition, it shows the mean rating (RATING) and the mean company size
(SIZE), the latter proxied by total annual sales of a firm, for all possible combinations of HBM and
COLTYPE. The variable RATING is an ordinal measure of borrower quality, representing the ex-
pected default probability as estimated by the lender (internal rating). The rating scheme used in
our analysis has been calibrated among all banks. It has six categories where a rating of 1 is the
best quality, and a rating of 6 is worst. Note that these bank internal borrower ratings are prior to
the assessment of collateral; therefore they reflect creditworthiness or borrower quality rather
than net exposure.
 
                                               
 13 Only one observation per individual is included if the analysis is restricted to one specific year; if the analysis
is for the entire sample period, individuals are repeatedly included.   14
 Table II
Sample statistics 1996: Rating, size, and degree of collateralization according to type of
collateral and housebank status
 COLTYPE  HBM  Observations  RATING  SIZE  COLDEGREE
 0  non-housebank  20  3.1  193.4  0
   housebank  10  2.6  132.5  0
   Total  30  2.9  173.1  0
 1  non-housebank  32  3.2  236.7  40.0
   housebank  21  2.7  164.6  41.6
   Total  53  3.0  208.1  40.2
 2  Total  0  --  --  --
 3  non-housebank  12  3.3  177.4  55.4
   housebank  3  4.0  301.8  59.7
   Total  15  3.4  202.3  56.7
 Total  non-housebank  64  3.2  212.0  32.1
   housebank  34  2.8  167.3  30.3
   total  98  3.0  196.5  31.5
 COLTYPE is a qualitative variable indicating the type of pledged collateral; HBM is a dummy variable indicating
whether a relationship is a housebank or a non-housebank relationship; RATING is the mean borrower rating;
SIZE is the mean annual turnover in DM million; and COLDEGREE is the ratio of collateral value to total credit
volume, i.e. the fraction of secured debt in terms of value.
 Table II uses 98 valid observations on collateralization for the year 1996, of which 35 % can be
attributed to housebank relationships. 30 out of 98 observations have no collateral. None of the
remaining 68 observations with collateral being pledged rely exclusively on personal securities.
 With respect to the housebank status, Table II reveals that company size is not significantly differ-
ent among the sub-samples, housebanks and normal banks (annual sales: DM 167m versus DM
212m). Furthermore, normal banks tend to contract more frequently for a simultaneous inclusion
of personal and real securities (12/64 versus 3/34 for housebanks). The ratio of noncollateralized
cases to total cases is about equal for both types of relationships (10/34 versus 20/64). The mean
rating across all types of collateral is significantly lower for housebank relationships (2.8 versus
3.2), indicating that housebank borrowers, on average, are expected to have lower default prob-
ability. Furthermore, in the univariate analysis Table II reveals no significant differences between
the types of collateral and the company size, the rating and the housebank status.   15
 In summary, three main findings emerge that bear on the empirical design of this study. First, the
sample is characterized by bank heterogeneity. The small sample size indicates that pooled time
series and cross sectional data should be used in subsequent regression analyses. Second, personal
securities are virtually never the only type of collateral being pledged. Therefore, an in-depth
analysis of inside versus outside collateral is infeasible based on our data and we dispense with the
variable COLTYPE. Third, the degree of collateralization in terms of value is left and right cen-
sored.
 
 4. Determinants of Collateralization
4.1 Methodology
 In this section, we will empirically identify the main determinants of collateral in loan contracting,
controlling for default risk, and relationship lending. This test is carried out in two steps. First, the
incidence of collateral in a loan contract, i.e. whether or not a loan is collateralized is explained. In
a second step, the determinants of collateral intensity are identified, i.e. the degree of collaterali-
zation.
 For an analysis of the incidence of loan collateralization, the binary variable COLYN is used as the
dependent variable. This test will be the starting point for our analysis, as it provides comparabil-
ity with previous studies. The second step uses each bank’s own assessment of collateral value,
where COLDEGREE is the ratio of collateral value to total credit volume. COLDEGREE not only
contains information on collateral incidence, but also on bank net exposure vis-à-vis the client.
 Both models are tested using a panel model with a one factor random effects specification, al-
lowing us to use the full sample, while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among individu-
als.14 Since COLYN is a dichotomous variable, we use a probit specification for our step-1 regres-
sion. Furthermore, since COLDEGREE is a censored variable we use a Tobit-formulation for our
step-2 regression.15
 The explanatory variables can be grouped as firm variables, risk variables, and relationship vari-
ables. Firm variables comprise an industry classification, where ENGINEER, CONSTR and TRADE
                                               
14  See Greene (1997), Chapter 14 and Hsiao (1986) for details relating to this specification.   16
are dummies representing engineering, construction, and trade, respectively. A second set of
dummies controls for the identity of the lender (BANK2 - BANK5). POTCOLLAT is a proxy for a
company's ability to provide inside collateral. This variable is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to
balance sheet total. A large value of POTCOLLAT indicates the presence of more valuable assets
potentially available as collateral. It is expected to influence COLDEGREE rather than the di-
chotomous variable COLYN. LOGSIZE measures the natural logarithm of a company's sales per
year, serving as a proxy for company size. Since company size potentially reflects the bargaining
power of the borrower, we expect to find a negative correlation between company size and col-
lateral. LIMLIAB is another dummy variable, indicating the corporate charter of the borrower.
 Based on existing evidence we include the logarithm of the size of the loan in the probit specifica-
tion, LOGVOLUME. This variable was found to have a positive influence on the incidence of col-
lateralization by Harhoff/Körting (1998), among others. For the second regression, with the de-
gree of collateralization as dependent variable, LOGVOLUME is substituted by FINSHARE, which
is the ratio of credit volume (loan size) supplied by the bank and total debt financing as reported
in the balance sheet.
 Expected default risk is proxied by the bank’s internal borrower ratings. Since RATING is an or-
dinal variable with six possible values, a dummy variable was assigned to each rating class. Three
dummies are included in the regressions: RATING3 to RATING5. Therefore, the prime borrowers
(RATING 1 and 2) with the lowest default probabilities serve as the reference group. There were
no observations with a distress rating of 6, rendering the inclusion of the respective dummy obso-
lete. According to Hypothesis 1, there should be a positive relation between credit risk and collat-
eral.
 Finally, to control for the effect of a bank-client relationship, we include our relational variable,
HBM, referring to the housebank status of the lender in a given relationship. According to Hy-
potheses 2, and given that collateral in our data set is largely identical with inside collateral, we
expect to find a positive coefficient for the relationship variable. HBVOLUME and HBFIN are the
interaction terms of the housebank status with loan volume and with financing share, respectively.
                                                                                                                                                      
15  See Baltagi (1995), pp. 183-184 for details.   17
 Table III summarizes our regression variables and specifies predicted signs of regression coeffi-
cients.
 Table III
Definition of explanatory variables
   Variable  Definition  Expected sign of coeffi-
cient
 control variables  BANK2 – BANK5  Set of dummies, 1 if debtor belongs to
bank x (x=2 to 5)
 No prediction
   ENGINEER, CONSTR,
TRADE
 Dummies, indicating whether a com-
pany is active in either engineering,
construction or trade industry
 No prediction
   LOGSIZE  Natural logarithm of a company's
annual sales (proxy for size)
 Negative
   LOGVOLUME  Natural logarithm of credit volume  Positive
   LIMLIAB  Dummy, indicating private limited
companies
 No prediction
   POTCOLLAT  Ratio of borrower fixed assets to bor-
rower total assets (potential ability to
pledge collateral)
 Positive
   FINSHARE  Relative importance of bank financing  Negative
 risk variables  RATING3 – RATING5  Dummy variables, representing bank
internal  ratings (1 is best, 6 is worst)
 Positive
 relationship  HBM  Dummy, 1 if housebank  Positive / Negative
   HBVOLUME  Interaction term between housebank
status and credit volume
 No predicition
   HBFIN  Interaction term between housebank
status and FINSHARE
 No predicition
 
 
 
4.2 Results
 The results of the panel analysis are presented in Table IV.   18
 Table IV
Determinants of collateralization - panel analysis
 Variables  Probit (dependent is COLYN)  Tobit (dependent is COLDEGREE)
 Constant  -0.89 (0.92)  187.59 (0.000)***
 BANK2  -4.69 (0.02)**  -52.92 (0.00)***
 BANK3  -8.75 (0.002)***  -29.62 (0.00)***
 BANK4  -1.50 (0.43)  13.17 (0.02)**
 BANK5  -0.19 (0.92)  8.08 (0.17)
 ENGINEER  -3.69 (0.02)**  -29.24(0.00)***
 CONSTR  6.07 (0.01)**  48.28 (0.00)***
 TRADE  1.97 (0.21)  -7.47 (0.14)
 LIMLIAB  -2.98 (0.01)**  -13.58 (0.005)***
 POTCOLLAT  -0.89 (0.97)  -0.02 (0.83)
 LOGSIZE  -0.88 (0.17)  -11.72 (0.000)***
 LOGVOLUME  2.17 (0.001)***  ---
 FINSHARE  ---  -8.50 (0.20)
 RATING3  -0.80 (0.46)  -7.99 (0.03)**
 RATING4  -0.59 (0.59)  -2.59 (0.46)
 RATING5  2.64 (0.93)  1.07 (0.94)
 HBM  17.64 (0.04)**  17.97 (0.002)***
 HBVOLUME  -1.94 (0.04)**  ---
 HBFIN  ---  -3.84 (0.70)
 N  472  472
 X
2 (Explanatory variables)  110,7 (0.00)***  174,24 (0,00)***
 C
2 (Random Effects)  236.46 (0.00)***  291.13 (0.00)***
 Pseudo-R
2  0.61  ---
 COLYN is a dummy variable, indicating whether or not collateral has been pledged, COLDEGREE is the ratio of
collateral value to total credit volume (x 100). For definitions of explanatory variables see Table III. The Tobit-
procedure adjusts for censoring at values of zero.16 p-values in parentheses. *,**,***: Significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
 
 Column 2 of Table IV displays the Probit-results, where the incidence of collateral in the loan
contract, COLYN, was regressed on the set of explanatory variables. As expected, there is con-
                                               
 16  Robustness tests showed that the qualitative results remain unchanged if one controls for censoring at
COLDEGREE equal to 100 as well as if one ignores censoring at all. The scale factor for marginal effects of   19
siderable heterogeneity among banks with respect to their collateral decisions. Three out of four
bank-dummy coefficients are significantly different from zero. Similarly, two out of three industry
dummies are significantly different form zero. Company size (LOGSIZE) has no significant influ-
ence on collateral requirements. Furthermore, the magnitude of potential inside collateral, as
proxied by POTCOLLAT, does not influence the incidence of collateral per se. However, loan size
significantly increases the probability of collateralization, in line with the findings of Har-
hoff/Körting (1998).
 We next turn to the rating coefficients, relating to Hypothesis 1, where expected default risk is
proxied for by RATING3 - RATING5. The hypothesis predicts a positive slope coefficient. How-
ever, the results are not in line with this prediction: the coefficients of the rating dummies have
different signs and are statistically insignificant. Hence, borrower quality does not influence the
decision to collateralize.17 The coefficient of HBM is positive and significantly different from zero,
revealing a systematic effect of relationship intensity on the incidence of collateral. Thus, consis-
tent with our second hypothesis, relationship lenders do behave differently as compared to "nor-
mal" bank lenders. The housebank status leads to a higher probability of collateralization. We will
give an interpretation of this finding below.
 We next turn to column 3 of Table IV. As mentioned above, the analysis of the dichotomous col-
lateralization variable COLYN uses only little information on collateral being pledged. Column 3
of Table IV reports the results of an extended analysis by using information on the value of collat-
eral as assessed by the banks themselves. Since COLDEGREE is a censored variable, a Tobit-
estimation is employed.
 With respect to most of the structural variables, the implications of the Tobit regression are simi-
lar (in terms of sign and significance) to those discussed above. Hence, we will not provide a
separate discussion of bank heterogeneity (BANK2-5), industry rooting (ENGINEER, CONSTR,
TRADE) and the role of the corporate charter (LIMLIAB). POTCOLLAT, the company's share of
fixed assets in total assets, carries again an insignificant and negative coefficient. The same holds
for FINSHARE our measure for the relative importance of the bank in debt financing. However, as
                                                                                                                                                      
the regressors is estimated as 0.87.
 17 This result is similar to Machauer/Weber (1998), and to some extent to Berger/Udell (1995), who find only
one out of eight risk measures to be a significant explanatory variable.   20
opposed to the probit regression, the degree of collateralization is negatively affected by firm size,
thus indicating some relevance of bargaining power on the side of the debtor.
 We now turn to the role of expected default risk, as expressed by internal bank ratings, in ex-
plaining collateral value. In the Tobit model, the rating coefficients have again different signs and
are - with one exception - insignificant. The one exception is RATING3. Since the prime rating
classes 1 and 2 serve as the benchmark and the low classes 4 and 5 are insignificant with opposing
signs, we interpret this result as evidence against both our hypothesis 1 and the traditional signal-
ing hypothesis. According to the former, collateral in debt contracts serves the purpose of neu-
tralizing the exposure of the lender or to set proper behavioral incentives for the borrower, and is
thus increasing in expected default risk. According to the latter hypothesis, collateral is predicted
to be a negative function of risk, as low risk borrowers signal their quality by offering large
amounts of collateral. Our findings are inconsistent with both hypotheses because, in our sample,
the value of collateral appears to be unrelated to default risk. This is supported by a test of the
null-hypothesis of all coefficients of the rating variables being simultaneously equal to zero. The
Wald-test statistic could not reject the null with a p-value of 95% in both models, the Probit- as
well as the Tobit-estimation.18
 In the theoretical literature, collateral is modeled either as a risk compensation device or an incen-
tive device. In both types of models, collateral is seen as outside collateral. We thus checked the
robustness of our results by including interaction terms between rating classes and the relative
magnitude of outside collateral in the Tobit regression. The qualitative results remained unaf-
fected, however.
 If collateral does neither compensate for default risk, nor does it signal borrower quality, what is a
valid explanation of its role in debt contract design? A clue to answering this question is provided
by the coefficients of the relationship variables, both in the Probit-specification and in the Tobit-
specification. Confirming the result of the Probit-analysis, the coefficient of HBM is positive and
highly significant in the Tobit-analysis. Thus, in comparison to a normal bank, the housebank is
more likely to require collateral and will do so for higher amounts. Therefore, the evidence sup-
ports hypothesis 2 with a positive association. As pointed out by Longhofer/Santos (1998) and
                                               
 18  It is again emphasized that the banks‘ internal ratings are not influenced by any collateralization. For further
details on the internal rating systems see Brunner/Krahnen/Weber  (2000).   21
Welch (1997), collateral seems to be a strategic instrument for strengthening a bank’s bargaining
position in renegotiations.
 The strategic role of collateral for future bargaining situations is a plausible explanations of our
findings in Table IV. It is, however, not the only possible explanation compatible with the evi-
dence. An alternative explanation that leads to the same set of predictions would simply rely on a
cost advantage of housebanks in assessing the market value of collateral. In order to differentiate
between the renegotiation argument on the one side and other explanations as for example the
cost advantage hypothesis on the other side, one has to gather information about bank behavior
subsequent to the onset of a borrower’s financial distress. We extend our analysis to cases of bor-
rower distress in the next section.
 Incidentally, since we have two variables describing the housebank status, we are able to compare
the explanatory power of two variables that attempt to proxy for relationship intensity, i.e. the
housebank variable HBM, and the relationship duration variable DURATION. The inclusion of
DURATION in our regressions does not materially change regression results. In particular, the
coefficient of DURATION is not significantly different from zero, while the HBM coefficient re-
mains relatively stable, and significant in both formulations. Since DURATION is also insignificant
if it is used as a substitute for HBM, one may conclude that duration of a bank-borrower relation-
ship is not an appropriate measure that captures the essence of relationship lending.
 5. Collateral Accumulation, Relationship Lending and Workout Activities
5.1 Methodology
 The preceding section established that relationship lenders tend to accumulate more collateral
than normal lenders, after controlling for credit risk. We interpret this finding as an indication of
housebank preparedness for borrower distress. With sufficient collateral at hand, the housebank
will be able to play a formative role in future bargaining situations that are caused by borrower
distress. In particular, if there are multiple lenders, and bargaining costs may thus be high, collat-
eral is instrumental in preparing for active involvement in the restructuring of distressed compa-
nies. In this section we make an initial attempt to understand the role of lenders vis-à-vis dis-
tressed borrowers. While in the last section our focus was on risk, and thus dealing with the ex-
pectation of default, the focus in this section is on actual distress according to the bank's own   22
judgment. In concentrating on the role played by housebanks, we will undertake a direct test of
our third hypothesis (the renegotiation hypothesis), developed in Section 2 above.
 If a borrower faces financial distress, it may be efficient either to liquidate the firm right away, or
to restructure it. It depends on the circumstances, whether an additional investment, as is required
in the case of a restructuring or a workout, is a positive net present value project. What will the
bank do? In many cases, restructuring will not be possible unless there are additional financial
resources forthcoming. Each bank among the company's creditors will therefore have to evaluate
the present value of an extended financial commitment vis-a-vis the company. If this present value
is positive, the required workout can be undertaken. Otherwise, for a negative present value, the
bank will not be willing to extend additional loans, or to take any other supportive action19. She
will rather pull back and, perhaps, trigger the liquidation of the company.
 Ceteris paribus, supportive actions by a particular lender in situations of borrower distress are
more likely (i) if his claims have priority over the claims of other creditors, (ii) if his bargaining
costs are expected to be low relative to other creditors, and (iii) if his uncertainty in the assess-
ment of the real economic value of a debtor’s assets is low. The first two conditions refer to the
free-riding problem that emerges in a borrower distress with multiple lenders. Relationship lending
and the accumulation of collateral are seen as complementary in view of solving this free-riding
problem. The third condition is especially true for those lenders with private information. Hence,
all three conditions are met by relationship lenders, and one should therefore expect that these do
engage more frequently in workouts than normal lenders.
 Additionally, according to the renegotiation argument, collateral distributes bargaining power
among lenders. Combining the bargaining power argument with the implicit insurance function of
relationship lending, the relevant prediction, Hypothesis 3, claims a positive correlation between
all three variables: the occurrence of workout activities, the accumulation of collateral, and the
existence of a lending relationship.
 For a formal test, we rely on our sub-sample of potentially distressed companies, as described
above. It includes credit-file data of 75 potentially distressed medium-sized German companies
over a five-year period (1/1992 -12/1996). Whenever there was a change of contract terms, or a
                                               
19  Supportive actions are those activities that increase the probability of a restructuring being successful. Exam-   23
re-rating, during this period, the complete set of variables was collected. The data set includes the
contract terms, current balance sheet data, risk assessment in terms of internal ratings, and infor-
mation on distress-related activities by the bank. The latter information typically is of a qualitative
nature, indicating the pledging of additional collateral, any change of credit outstanding (including
debt forgiveness, credit rationing, redemption of loans or the granting of additional loans). The
data set also includes information on the termination of a bank-borrower relationship, like for
example the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.
 The structure of the data used in this section of the paper, the PD-sample, is different in some
respect to the representative sample (R-sample) used in Section 4. First, observations of a given
individual are in single years (typically the year where the distress event occurred) significantly
more frequent than in the R-sample, e.g. some companies then have up to six contract modifica-
tions. Second, as was to be expected, the survivorship rate is lower in the PD-sample, due to liq-
uidation decisions and relationship terminations. Given this structure, we do not conduct a panel
analysis but focus on cross-sectional analysis.
 In order to identify the banks involvement in a private workout, we define a proxy variable that is
positively related to workout activities by the bank. This variable is labeled WORKOUT and is
assigned a value of one if either bank activities relating to workout investments are documented in
the credit files, and/or financial support is explicitly documented. In particular, such workout ac-
tivities comprise the setup of a lender syndicate, the provision of consultancy services delivered or
initiated by the bank itself, an active search for a potential merger candidate, or any other activity
that indicates the heavy involvement of the bank in a restructuring.20
Our data may be affected by a type of observational bias which is common for panel studies.
Though we document all workout activities that occur during the period of observation (1992-
1996), some such activities will have started before the beginning of our sample period, or they
happen only after the end of our sample period. As a consequence, we require for each individual
in the sample to have at least one year of observation after the onset of financial distress. Addi-
tionally, companies with contract termination during the initial two years of our sample period
were also excluded from the analysis.
                                                                                                                                                      
ples comprise the provision of consulting services, or the extension of additional loans, see below.
20  Some illustrative example cases are documented in the Appendix.   24
This leaves us with 62 firms for an analysis of bank workout activities. Our main focus is on de-
terminants of the workout decision, with a special focus on the key factors of this paper, collateral
and relationship lending. We employ a logit estimation, where the binary dependent variable
(WORKOUT) is regressed on housebank attribution (HBM), the degree of collateralization,
(COLDEGREE), as well as the interaction term of these two variables (HBCOLLAT), to control
for the coordination-related function of collateral in relationship lending.
In addition, we control for company heterogeneity by using LOGSIZE, LIMLIAB and
ENGINEERING as structural variables.21 As before, FINSHARE measures the relative importance
of a particular bank among all creditors of a firm. HBFIN and FINCOLLAT are the respective in-
teraction terms used to sort out the joint effect of financing share and relationship lending or col-
lateralization, respectively. Finally, we include a measure of the importance of debt for total fi-
nancing of a given borrower, labeled LEVERAGE. It is defined as the ratio of total debt financing
to balance sheet total in percentage points.
For all variables, the observation at the distress event or, in case of missing observations, immedi-
ately before this date are used.
Table V shows the frequency distribution of WORKOUT over housebank status and banks, indi-
cating a sufficient degree of variability for carrying out a logit analysis. Additionally, Table V
shows that there are two banks for which no observation with a workout exist. Therefore, we
dispense with the bank dummies to avoid estimation problems.
                                               
21  We dropped the other industry variables since about 80% of the sample firms belong to the manufacturing
industry.   25
Table V
Frequency Distribution of WORKOUT
BANK HBM
1 2 3 4 5 ￿ 0 1 ￿
HBM 0 9 3 10 10 10 42
1 1 8 4 5 2 20
￿ 10 11 14 15 12 62
WORKOUT 0 10 7 7 10 12 46 34 12 46
1 0 4 7 5 0 16 8 8 16
￿ 10 11 14 15 12 62 42 20 62
WORKOUT is a binary variable, indicating whether workout activities occurred or not; HBM
is housebank attribution dummy, BANK indicates the bank form which an observation origi-
nates.
5.2 Results
Table VI contains the results of two logit models estimating the determinants of the workout inci-
dence. Model I includes only one interaction term, HBCOLLAT, the role of collateral under rela-
tionship lending. Model II considers the two additional interaction effects, namely the financing
share in relationship lending, and its interaction with the provision of collateral, HBFIN and
FINCOLLAT.   26
Table VI
Logit regression of workout incidence on a set of explanatory variables
Regressors Model I Model II
Constant 16.46 (0.03)**
(0.03)
35.96  (0.008)***
(0.01)
ENGINEER -2.47  (0.03)**
(0.03)
-5.26  (0.007)***
(0.008)
LOGSIZE - 0.81 (0.08)*
(0.09)
-2.37  (0.011)**
(0.013)
LIMLIAB -2.77  (0.02)**
(0.02)
-5.10  (0.008)***
(0.009)
LEVERAGE -0.08 (0.012)**
(0.01)
-0.14  (0.004)***
(0.004)
FINSHARE - 10.12  (0.01)**
(0.01)
9.47  (0.14)
(0.14)
COLDEGREE 0.03  (0.14)
(0.15)
0.12  (0.007)***
(0.007)
HBM 6.64  (0.007)***
(0.009)
9.37 (0.02)**
(0.02)
HBCOLLAT - 0.05  (0.08)*
(0.09)
0.04  (0.40)
(0.41)
HBFIN --- - 0.15  (0.03)**
(0.04)
FINCOLLAT --- - 0.43 (0.013)**
(0.01)
N 62 62
LR-statistic 20.27 (0.005)*** 35.49  (0.0001)***
Pseudo-R
2 0.29 0.50
Predictive improvement 31.25% 50.00%
Hosmer-Lemeshow-Statistic 6.7 (0.35) 3.52 (0.74)
The dependent variable is WORKOUT which is assigned a value of one if workout activities occurred, and zero
otherwise; ENGINEER is binary: 1 if a firm is rooted in the engineering industry; LOGSIZE is the natural loga-
rithm of a company's annual sales; LIMLIAB is binary: 1 if incorporated; HBM is binary: 1 if housebank;
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt financing to balance sheet total; COLDEGREE is the ratio of collateral value
to total credit volume in percentage points, HBCOLLAT the corresponding interaction term with HBM;
FINSHARE is the ratio of total credit volume supplied by the respective bank to total debt financing of a bor-
rower, HBFIN and FINCOLLAT the corresponding interaction term with HBM and COLDEGREE, respectively.
All observations of the explanatory variables were taken at or immediately before the distress event. p-values in
parentheses. Values in italics are p-values based on robust estimation using a generalized linear model (GLM).
The predictive improvement measures the increase in correct classifications of the estimated model compared
to a naive model with constant probability. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is a Goodness-of-Fit test with the null
hypothesis of no misspecification. *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   27
Considering the structural variables first, there is clear indication of firm heterogeneity in both
specifications. The coefficients for ENGENEERING, LOGSIZE and LIMLIAB have a negative and
significant coefficient. Therefore, e.g., the probability of workout activities occurring is higher for
smaller companies. The coefficient of LEVERAGE, the measure for the relative importance of debt
as a funding source, is negative and significantly different from zero. It indicates that more debt in
the capital structure tends to reduce the workout probability, abstracting from relationship lend-
ing.
At the core of our analysis are the variables COLDEGREE and HBM. The coefficient of HBM is
positive and significantly different from zero, indicating a higher probability of an active workout
involvement of housebanks as compared to normal banks. This is consistent with hypothesis 3,
while, in Model I, the coefficients of both COLDEGREE and FINSHARE are not compatible. The
former is positive but insignificant, whereas the latter is significantly different from zero and
negative. However, Model I does not account for a potential substitutability of a bank’s financing
share and the degree of collateralization. For example, suppose a bank is almost the exclusive
financier of a firm. In this case, the additional provision of collateral will not have much impact on
workout decisions since expected coordination conflicts are low, and incremental cash flow
caused by workout activities will flow to the exclusive financier anyway. The same argument may
hold for the housebank status and the financing share. Model II explicitly accounts for such sub-
stitutional effects between the financing share, collateralization and the housebank status by in-
cluding the respective interaction terms.
As a result, the explanatory power of the model increases considerably, as is evidenced by the
increase in R
2 and the predictive improvement (over a naive prediction) of 50%, compared to
31.25% in Model I. The coefficients of the interaction terms FINCOLLAT and HBFIN are signifi-
cantly different from zero. Their coefficients are negative, confirming the substitutional relation-
ship between these determinants.
Finally, and most importantly, the direct effects of both collateralization and relationship lending
are significantly positive, thereby providing strong evidence for our renegotiation hypothesis 3.
An increase in collateral value as well as the existence of a relationship thus strengthens workout
efforts by banks.   28
6. Conclusions
To date, there is very little empirical evidence on the evolution of financial relationships and on
their role in situations of borrower distress. Lack of data is probably the most serious reason for
our limited understanding of the role of housebanks, and more generally, of information-intensive
borrower-lender relationships. This paper draws on a unique set of credit-file data that includes
observations on borrower-related bank decisions, on contract design, on the bank's own assess-
ment of individual borrower risk and, most importantly, on bank decision-making after the occur-
rence of financial distress. The five-year panel structure allows a dynamic analysis of the problem.
It is to the best of our knowledge the first empirical study that directly addresses the role of rela-
tionship lending in times of borrower distress. The results reported in this paper strengthen the
understanding of the real effects of relationship lending.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We first look at collateral in loan contracts prior to the onset
of a distress. We then looked at the role of collateral and relationship lending after distress has
occurred. In particular, we analyze the determinants of activities supporting firm restructuring and
corporate workout.
As to the first step concerning the relation of collateral, both in terms of incidence and in terms of
value, to the ex ante default risk of the borrower, there are opposing predictions in the literature.
Signaling models predict a negative relation between the value of collateral and default risk, while
risk compensation and incentive-oriented models predict a positive correlation between collateral
and default risk. Our findings do not lend support to any of these predictions. The incidence of
collateral, i.e. the choice between an unsecured and a secured loan, is statistically independent of
the borrower's default risk. Similarly, there is no statistically significant difference in the degree of
collateralization between prime borrowers and low-quality borrowers (with the highest default
expectation).
We find evidence consistent with the idea of housebanks accumulating collateral over time.
Housebanks do require collateral more frequently and in larger amounts, relative to the loans out-
standing, as compared to normal banks. This finding may be explained as an attempt by house-
banks to increase the lock-in of borrowers and to strengthen the bank’s future position in contract
renegotiation.   29
Using a complementary data set of distressed loans, we were able to further pursue the analysis of
workout activities. Using a logit model, we identified the determinants of workout investments by
banks. Our findings indicate that the degree of collateralization is positively correlated with the
level of future workout activities. In addition, we find the housebank to be significantly more ac-
tive in company restructuring than a "normal" lender. Both results support the Longhofer/Santos
(1998) model on the dynamics of relationship lending. Strong financiers, housebanks, accumulate
collateral in "good" times, and get actively involved in company restructuring in "bad" times. In
this sense, collateral serves a strategic function in that it shapes the bank's future position in a re-
negotiation process. In particular, the accumulation of collateral serves not only as a pledged asset
against the loan outstanding, but it also restricts the borrower and other creditors in a desirable
way.
The findings reported in this paper give rise to an important follow-up question addressing the
shareholder value implications of their involvement, which by some is seen to be typical for bank-
oriented financial systems. As has been shown, relationship lenders are the most important claim
holders and the prime providers of workout support in situations of borrower distress. Do their
activities add value in terms of workout success? Does relationship lending enhance an efficient
choice between workout involvement and timely liquidation? Clearly, these questions have to be
answered before one may attempt to evaluate the overall vices and virtues of housebanking as a
financial institution.Appendix Cases with WORKOUT investments (examples)
No General descriptives Workout activity Distress consequence Additional Notes
Distress-Event Industry Number bank
relationships
Consultant Takeover Restructuring Formal
insolvency
Loan value
adjustment
Termination Liquidation
1 05.11.91 Chemistry 12 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 Debt restructuring, development of reorganiza-
tion plan
2 26.03.93 Electricity 3 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 Additional credit supply, development of reor-
ganization plan
3 19.09.96 Construc-
tion
3 X 0 0 0 X 0 0 Debt restructuring
4 28.01.94 Automotive
supplier
18 0 X X 0 X 0 0 Debt restructuring
5 27.10.94 Wood 6 0 0 0 0 X X X Banks become shareholder.
Group WORKOUT
= 1
--- ˘6,5 ￿5 ￿5 ￿7 ￿1 ￿13 ￿2 ￿1 Total cases: 16
Group WORKOUT
= 0
--- ˘5,7 ￿0 ￿0 ￿4 ￿4 ￿15 ￿4 ￿3 Total cases: 46
Distress Event= date of initial distress event, Consultant= bank initiated and hired consultant, Takeover= bank actively engaged in search for merger /takeover candidate, Restructuring= Bank leads restructuring
pool or is actively engaged in development of restructuring concept, Formal insolvency= Distress ends with formal insolvency procedure. Group= summary statistics with WORKOUT equal to zero and one, respec-
tively. Debt restructuring comprises loan volume reductions, additional collateral requirements, change in maturity structure or interest payments etc.References
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